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1Executive Summary
Until recently, most policy debates on pensions — especially in Europe
— focused on public responsibilities and the diﬃculties that many publicly
funded schemes have in meeting their obligations. However, recent events,
not least declines in stock markets, have increased the salience of such issues
in privately funded pensions. This has major implications for countries,
such as the U.S. and U.K. which have already gone heavily down the private
funding route. However, it may also aﬀect the attractiveness of this option as
an alternative to public funding. The Pension Beneﬁt Guaranty Corporation
(PBGC) estimates that US companies have accumulated pension deﬁcits of
around 300 billion dollars. In the UK, Morgan Stanley estimates that the
aggregate pension deﬁcit of the FTSE 100 companies in the end of 2002 is
65 billion pounds. Serious deﬁcits are also reported in private occupational
plans in Germany and the Netherlands.
It is tempting to view the woes of privately funded pensions as an exoge-
nous event driven by the world-wide shift in investor conﬁdence. However,
this is at best an incomplete picture. It is clear cut that there is signiﬁcant
variation in the performance of pension plans subject to the same market
conditions. Moreover, there has been an increasing focus on pension plans
whose poor performance can be attributed to ﬁrms’ excessive investment in
own stock. When ENRON failed, its employees lost not only their job but
also most of their pension assets, of which over 60% was invested in EN-
RON stocks. This suggests that a full understanding on the issues needs
to understand the framework in which investment and funding decisions are
made.
These issues should be in seen in the context of the shift from deﬁned
beneﬁt( D B )t od e ﬁned contribution (DC) pension plans. In the US, contri-
butions to 401(k) plans (the main form of DC scheme) amounted to 18% of
total contributions in 1985. Today, they make up over 80% of the total. In
the UK, this shift has been both more recent and more dramatic. Since 2001
scores of companies have closed down their DB plan to new entrants and, in
some case, they have dismantled existing DB plans. To their disappointment,
employees have been oﬀered DC plans instead.
This paper uses contract theory to analyze the interplay of residual claims
and control rights in private pensions. In private pension governance, the
key determinant of residual claim is the choice between DB and DC. In
principle, surpluses and losses accrue to the sponsor in a DB plan and to the
2beneﬁciaries in a DC plan. We study the interaction between the DB/DC
choice and three areas of control rights: funding decisions, asset allocation,
and asset management. Under complete contracting, governance can be
s h o w nt ob en e u t r a l : D Ca n dD Bp l a n sd i ﬀer only on risk allocation. If
instead contracts are incomplete, a DB (DC) plan should: (1) Assign more
vigilance responsibility to the sponsor (beneﬁciaries); (2) Rely less (more) on
trustees; (3) Tend to employ trustees that are professional experts (caring
insiders); (4) Assign asset allocation rights to the sponsor (beneﬁciaries); (5)
have strict funding requirements.
31 Introduction
Until recently, most policy debates on pensions — especially in Europe — fo-
cused on public responsibilities and the diﬃculties that many publicly funded
schemes have in meeting their obligations. However, recent events, not least
declines in stock markets, have increased the salience of such issues in pri-
vately funded pensions. This has major implications for countries, such as
the U.S. and U.K. which have already gone heavily down the private funding
route. However, it may also aﬀect the attractiveness of this option as an
alternative to public funding. The Pension Beneﬁt Guaranty Corporation
(PBGC) estimates that US companies have accumulated pension deﬁcits of
around 300 billion dollars. In the UK, Morgan Stanley estimates that the
aggregate pension deﬁcit of the FTSE 100 companies in the end of 2002 is
65 billion pounds. Serious deﬁcits are also reported in private occupational
plans in Germany and the Netherlands.
It is tempting to view the woes of privately funded pensions as an exoge-
nous event driven by the world-wide shift in investor conﬁdence. However,
this is at best an incomplete picture. It is clear cut that there is signiﬁcant
variation in the performance of pension plans subject to the same market
conditions. Moreover, there has been an increasing focus on pension plans
whose poor performance can be attributed to ﬁrms’ excessive investment in
own stock. When ENRON failed, its employees lost not only their job but
also most of their pension assets, of which over 60% was invested in EN-
RON stocks. This suggests that a full understanding on the issues needs
to understand the framework in which investment and funding decisions are
made.
These issues should be in seen in the context of the shift from deﬁned
beneﬁt( D B )t od e ﬁned contribution (DC) pension plans (Poterba et al. [16]).
In the US, contributions to 401(k) plans (the main form of DC scheme)
amounted to 18% of total contributions in 1985. Today, they make up over
80% of the total. In the UK, this shift has been both more recent and more
dramatic. Since 2001 scores of companies have closed down their DB plan
to new entrants and, in some case, they have dismantled existing DB plans.
To their disappointment, employees have been oﬀered DC plans instead.
This paper develops a framework which links issues of invetsment perfor-
mance and funding adequacy to the nature of the pension contract (DC/DB).
T ot h i se n d ,w ed e v e l o pa na p p r o a c ht op e n s i o np r o v i s i o ni n s p i r e db yc o n -
tract theory. The main focus is on governance. Paralleling the literature on
4corporate governance, we study the importance of residual claims and control
rights in creating incentives for good performance. As in the theory of the
ﬁrm, the starting point is the acknowledgment that contracts are incomplete.
It is essential in pension plans to understand who owns the residual surplus
or deﬁcit (shareholders, creditors, employees, etc...) and who has the right
to make decisions. Our results make plain the link between residual claim
structure and control right allocation in the context of pension funds.1
In private pension governance, the key determinant of residual claim is
the choice between DB and DC. In principle, surpluses and losses accrue to
the sponsor in a DB plan and to the beneﬁciaries in a DC plan. In practice,
things are complicated by several factors, such as the possible presence of
other residual claimant like insurers, the legal diﬃculty for a sponsor to
appropriate surpluses, or the risk for insolvency. We will examine some of
those — extremely important — complications later in the text but our starting
point is a stylized dichotomy between a DB plan in which the sponsor is the
residual claimant and a DC plan in which the beneﬁciaries have residual
claims.
We study the interaction between the DB/DC choice and three areas of
control rights: funding decisions, asset allocation, and asset management.
Funding decisions relate to the determination of the monetary ﬂows into the
pension fund. Asset allocation and asset management are two components
of the plan’s investment strategy. Asset allocation is a high-level longer-term
decision on the classes of assets that the fund will invest in. For example,
it includes the choice of how much to devote to ﬁxed income and how much
to devote to equity, or to whether to allow, or even encourage, investment
in own stock. Asset management is instead the day-to-day determination
of the investment portfolio within the broad classes identiﬁed in the asset
allocation phase. While the distinction between asset allocation and asset
management is one of degrees, in practice there is an important diﬀerence:
in most plans asset management is outsourced to external fund managers
while asset allocation is not. Therefore, in the case of asset management,
the important point is vigilance. Whoever is in charge of monitoring asset
management must exert eﬀort to evaluate the performance of fund managers
and, if necessary, ﬁre underperformers and hire promising managers.
The core contribution of this paper is to establish a connection between
the residual claim structure of a pension fund and its optimal control right
1S e eT i r o l e[ 2 1 ] .
5s t r u c t u r e . T h ea n a l y s i si si nm a n yw a y ss i m p l e . H o w e v e r ,i tp r o v i d e sa
ﬁrst step towards identifying challenging theoretical questions and interesting
empirical puzzles, suggesting directions for future research.
The players in our model are the sponsor (the employer or a group of
employers), the beneﬁciaries (the workers who participate to the plan), and
the fund manager. We will also consider another class of actors, who are sup-
posed to monitor the pension fund on behalf of the beneﬁciaries. Following
the common law term, we will refer to them as trustees.
We begin by analyzing a world of complete contracts. The sponsor and
the beneﬁciaries can sign binding agreements on all the aspects of the pension
plans. In particular they can contract on how much vigilance on the fund
manager each party will exert and what asset allocation they will choose. In
this context, we prove an irrelevance result. If both parties are risk-neutral a
DB and a DC plan are equivalent, in that they produce the same equilibrium
level of vigilance, the same allocation, and the same expected utility for both
parties. If the parties are not risk-neutral, then the choice between DB and
DC is only determined by which party is more risk averse.
The complete contract world constitutes a benchmark. In order to get
interesting governance result, we need to consider contract incompleteness.
For analytical clarity, we do this in steps. First, we consider non-contractible
vigilance. This will, among other things, provide a role for trustees. We also
examine the possibility that the contract between the beneﬁciaries and the
trustees is, in turn, incomplete and we compare alternative incentive struc-
tures for trustees: either professional trustees motivated by career concerns
or “caring laymen” driven by a stake in the pension fund. Second, we see
what happens when asset allocation is non-contractible. While the analysis
is general, we have in mind two areas of practical interest: purchase of own
company stock and excessive risk taking. Finally, we remove the assumption
that funding levels are contractible. We endogenize the possibility of default
and we study the link between residual claimancy, risk of insolvency, and
incentives for underfunding.
Each of the three steps is accompanied by a critical survey of existing
work, which is mostly of an empirical nature. Theoretical predictions are
compared with available evidence. In some cases, interesting puzzles emerge,
such as the underperformance of pension fund in comparison with mutual
funds. In other cases, the theory helps us identify areas in which more
empirical work could be particularly useful, such as in analyzing the personal
characteristics and the incentive structures of pension fund trustees.
6The structure of the paper is as follows. In the next section, we discuss
the background to the analysis in the paper and related literature. In section
3, we introduce the model that we use throughout the paper. Section 4 then
shows that governance issues are irrelevant in a world of complete contracts.
In section 5, we focus in on incentives for vigilance in pension plans. We also
discuss the role of trustees. In section 6 we discuss asset allocation in greater
detail while in section 7 we look at underfunding. Section 8 concludes.
2B a c k g r o u n d
The structure developed here is most appropriate for thinking about private
occupational plans. We leave out state pensions and supplementary private
pensions in which the employer plays no role. In occupational pensions,
a key relationship is that between the pension sponsor (the employer or a
set of employers) and the beneﬁciary (the employee, who will draw pension
beneﬁts upon retirement). They are collectively responsible for monitoring
the way in which the pension assets are managed. In the basic model that
we study, we discuss how the level of vigilance depends on the structure of
the contract.2
There are a number of key players involved in pension fund management.
At the heart of it all are the beneﬁciaries and the sponsor. The roles that
they fulﬁl depend on the exact pension contract on oﬀer. However, both are
typically contributors to the pension fund and may play a role in checking
that the fund is properly managed.
The assets in the plan are typically managed by a fund manager. The
typical form of contract depends on size the funds under management. The
main ﬁnancial incentive therefore comes through increases the size of this
i.e., not losing the contract. Also important can be the terms on which
annuities are oﬀered or purchased in the fund. The quality of annuities may
be a function of a good management, for example, appropriately matching
assets and liabilities.3
There are two kinds of important “external” actors. Many funds rely
on external audit and validation. The increasing importance of consulting
2For an excellent overview of private pension governance in several countries see OECD
[12].
3Annuitization is not discussed in this paper. For an analysis of the asymmetric infor-
mation problems related to annuities, see Finkelstein and Poterba [3].
7actuaries is a key feature of pension fund governance in recent years. These
can play an important role of pension fund management. However, recent
accounting scandals in the United States have served as reminder that incen-
tives matter in getting auditing done eﬀectively — it is not merely an issue of
mechanical checks.
The other key players are monitors. In common law countries, the pension
scheme is typically set up as a trust and the monitoring role is taken up by
trustees. In other legal systems,it can be a foundation with a foundation
board (NL, CH), a mutual association with a board of directors (Germany),
or a pension fund management company supervised by a control commission
(Portugal and Spain). For simplicity, we refer to the person or body in charge
of monitoring the plan as “the trustee”. While we do not underestimate
diﬀerences in legal systems, we choose to model the trustee in a stylized
manner in order to provide an accessible discussion of general features of
monitoring in pension plans.
From an economic point of view, pension funds are a network of overlap-
ping contractual arrangements that specify obligations on the part of all of
these key players. If all behavior were the subject of veriﬁable contractual
arrangements and there were no information problems, the governance struc-
ture would be largely a veil — any incentives available under one governance
structure could be replicated by another by appropriate choice of contracts.
We argue that incompleteness of contracts is a key feature of pension fund
governance and will imply the need to match the governance structure to the
incentives of the various parties and the nature of the pension contract being
used.
It should be remarked from the outset that the aim of the present analysis
is not to provide a realistic description of pension fund governance, but rather
to identify, in a simpliﬁed model, a few aspects of pension plans that appear
to be crucial from a governance perspective.
3T h e B a s i c M o d e l
There are three players: the beneﬁciary (subscript b), the sponsor (subscript
s) and the asset manager. The asset manager produces a stochastic return r
∈ [0,∞). There are two kinds of actions which aﬀect the pattern of returns
which we call vigilance, denoted v and asset allocation denoted by a where
8a ∈ A. The cumulative distribution of return r is denoted by:
F (r|v,a),
where Fv (r|v,a) ≤ 0 for all returns r: vigilance induces a ﬁrst order stochas-
tically dominating distribution of returns. The way in which returns depend
on a need not be speciﬁed in general. However, the reader may prefer to
think of asset allocation as a set of decisions that aﬀect the riskiness of the
distribution of returns while vigilance aﬀects the mean.
By a, we mostly have in mind the possibility that a portion of the pension
fund is used to purchase stocks in the sponsor company or in companies
associated with the sponsor company. This is common practice for certain
categories of pension plans in the US and it brings the sponsor two potential
beneﬁts: additional ﬁnancing at rates that are lower than market rates and
long-term performance-related incentives for the workforce. Mitchell and
Utkus [8] provide a comprehensive analysis of investment in company stock
in the United States.
The sponsor is assumed to be risk neutral, while the beneﬁciary may be
risk averse. We suppose that this return can be responsive to vigilance by
the beneﬁciary and sponsor. Total vigilance is v = vb+vs. Asset allocation
is an indivisible decision and can only be controlled by one or other party.
We assume that the sponsor and the beneﬁciary strike a contract that
speciﬁe sas e r i e so fc o n t r i b u t i o n si n t oap e n s i o np l a na l o n gw i t hac o n s t i t u t i o n
which speciﬁes responsibility for vigilance and asset allocation. The sponsor
and the beneﬁciaries face a cost from being vigilant denoted by cb (vb)i nt h e
case of the beneﬁciaries and cs (vs) for the sponsor. Asset allocation has no
direct cost. However, we assume that the beneﬁciary may have preferences
over which assets are held in their pension plan (for example as a means
of bolstering demand for the ﬁrm’s own stock). These considerations are
captured by a function d(a).
We consider two contractual structures for pension plans: deﬁned beneﬁts
and deﬁned contribution. For the purposes of this exercise the key distinction
between the two is in terms of residual claimancy. In a DB plan, this is the
sponsor, while in the DC plan it is the beneﬁciary. The pension plan is
bundled with an employment contract which we model very simply. The
beneﬁciary receives a retirement plan and a monetary wage w.
To keep the model tractable, we assume that there are two periods. In
the ﬁrst period, the sponsor oﬀers a wage and makes a unitary contribution
9to the pension fund.4 In the second period, the fund return is realized,
the beneﬁciary receives his beneﬁt, and the sponsor may make an additional
contribution or receive a distribution from the fund. For simplicity we assume
that the sponsor and the beneﬁciary have the same discount rate and we
normalize it to one. For simplicity, the utility function of the beneﬁciary is
assumed to be separable and identical across the two periods. A beneﬁciary
that receives wage w in period 1 and pension beneﬁt p in period 2 has utility
U (w)+U (p). The function U has the usual properties including U0 > 0a n d
U00 ≤ 0.5
In a DB plan, the sponsor is the residual claimant. The beneﬁciary is







rdF (r|v,a) − p + d(a) − w − cs (vs)
W
DB
b (w,v,a)=U (w)+U (p) − cb (vb)
By assuming that the sponsor always pays the promised pension p,w ea r e
excluding the possibility of default. We will examine the risk of insolvency
in sections 6 and 7.
In a DC plan, the sponsor has no claims to the returns from the invest-
ment. Hence, she faces only monitoring costs. The beneﬁciary now bears
the full risk from the investment returns. The payoﬀs now are, therefore,
W
DC






U (r)dF (r|v,a) − cb (vb)
Thus, in our stylized framework, the only diﬀerence between a DB and a DC
plan is ownership of the return r.I naD Cp l a nt h eb e n e ﬁciary owns r, while
in a DB plan the beneﬁciary owns p and the sponsor owns the diﬀerence r−p
4In this section, we simplify the problem by assuming an exogeneously given contri-
bution to the pension plan (perhaps due to unmodeled tax reasons). In Section 7 we
endogenize the sponsor’s contribution and consider the possibility of over- and underfund-
ing.
5The assumption that there are only two periods allows us to abstract from other —
perhaps equally important — diﬀerences between DB and DC plans. For instance, in a
truly dynamic model we would need to consider the diﬀerential eﬀect of career risks on
the two schemes.
10(which can be negative or positive). In both plans, the sponsor contributes
a unitary amount in period 1. As no assumption is made on p, we cannot
say whether the expected beneﬁti sh i g h e ru n d e rD Co rD B .
4 Complete Contracts
Suppose now that vigilance and asset allocation can be contracted over per-
fectly in the sense that the two parties can sign binding contracts on how
much vigilance each of them will exert and what the asset allocation will
be (and they can make side-payments to each other). We assume that the
sponsor is the one designing the scheme. She chooses between DB and DC
and she selects vigilance vs and vb and allocation a.W ea l s oa s s u m et h a t ,i n
order to persuade the beneﬁciary to accept a job at the sponsor company, the
s p o n s o rm u s to ﬀer a total level of utility u (equal to an unmodeled outside
option).6
First, assume that both parties are risk neutral. We shall prove an irrel-
evance result: the optimal governance structure is the same in a DB or DC
plan.
T h es p o n s o rm u s tp r o v i d eu t i l i t yu. In a DB plan this means
w + p − cb (vb)=u,




rdF (r|v,a) − cb (vb)=u
Then, substituting w into the sponsor’s payoﬀ, we see that a sponsor who
must provide her risk-neutral beneﬁciary with expected utility u obtains the






rdF (r|v,a)+d(a) − u − cb (vb) − cs (vs) j ∈ {DB,DC}.
6The assumption that it is the sponsor who designs the the scheme is not driving the
results. The two propositions of this section would hold as stated if the scheme were
designed by the beneﬁciary under the constraint that it provides a certain expected payoﬀ
to the sponsor.
11This means that, for any u, the optimal vigilance and allocation do not
depend on whether the plan is DB or DC. Moreover, the sponsor’s expected
payoﬀ i st h es a m ei r r e s p e c t i v eo fw h ot h er e s i d u a lc l a i m a n ti s .T h u s ,
Proposition 1 With complete contracting and a risk-neutral beneﬁciary, the
optimal vigilance vs and vb and allocation a do not depend on whether the
plan is DB or DC. Moreover, the sponsor and the beneﬁciary are indiﬀerent
between DB and DC.
The result is intuitive. The sponsor and the beneﬁciary agree on what an





rdF (r|v,a)+d(a) − cb (vb) − cs (vs).
Whether the residual claimant is the sponsor or the beneﬁciary, they will
implement the eﬃcient vigilance and asset allocation. The choice between
DB and DC determines only the allocation of risk, but that is inconsequential
because both parties are risk neutral.
Next, suppose — perhaps more realistically — that the beneﬁciary is risk-
averse. We can show
Proposition 2 With complete contracts, a risk averse beneﬁciary, and a
risk neutral sponsor, a DB plan is always optimal.7
Proof. As before, ﬁx a level of utility u and assume that the sponsor
must provide the beneﬁciary with u.I naD Bp l a nt h i sm e a n s
U (w)+U (p) − cb (vb)=u,










7T h ec o n v e r s eh o l d si ft h eb e n e ﬁciary is risk neutral and the sponsor is risk averse. A
DC plan is optimal.





Hence, for any possible vs, vb, and a, it is cheaper for the sponsor to provide
utility u through a DB plan rather than a DC plan.
With complete contracting, pension governance and risk allocation are
essentially orthogonal. If both parties are risk-neutral, it does not matter
who the residual claimant is. If one party is risk-averse and the other risk-
neutral, then the residual claimant should be the latter. As it is reasonable to
assume that the beneﬁciary is more risk-averse than the sponsor, this result
speaks in favor of DB plans.
One should emphasize that DB optimality is not a general result. We
h a v ed i s p e l l e dw i t ho t h e rr i s k ss u c ha sl a b o rm a r k e ta n dh u m a nc a p i t a lr i s k
which can be more important in a DB than a DC plan. Notwithstanding,
there is a general point here — that under complete contracting the choice
between a DC and DB plan should reﬂect only the optimal allocation of risk
bearing between the sponsor and the beneﬁciary and not the incentives for
monitoring.
In the rest of the paper, we drop the assumption of complete contracting.
As we wish to focus on pure governance issues rather than risk allocation,
we assume that both parties are risk neutral. Thus, Proposition 1 provides a
benchmark against which we can compare all the other results. Our strategy
will be to consider the issues one dimension at a time. We begin with the
study of vigilance.
5 Vigilance
We now depart from the complete contracting benchmark by assuming that
vigilance is non-contractible. This is realistic since the kinds of prudential
activities that are demanded for the successful management of a plan are
very diﬃcult to write down in a contract. To study the non-contractability
o fv i g i l a n c ei ni s o l a t i o n ,w ea s s u m et h a td(a) = 0 and suppress all reference
to a in what follows.8
8The present analysis does not allow for interactions between vigilance and asset allo-
cation. However, less common types of investment — like emerging markets or hedge funds
— might require more vigilance. One might conjecture that plans that provide strong vig-
13Any vigilance in a pension plan now has to be incentive compatible, i.e.,
in the interest of the vigilant party to carry it out. Thus we need to consider
vigilance levels (ˆ vs,ˆ vb) that form a Nash equilibrium between the sponsor
and the beneﬁciary, i.e., satisfy:




s (vs +ˆ vb) − cs (vs)




b (ˆ vs + vb) − cb (vb).
It is immediate to see that only the residual claimant has an incentive to exert
vigilance. One of the two parties, the beneﬁciary in DB and the sponsor in
DC, will shirk completely.
Proposition 3 Suppose that vigilance is not contractible. In a DC plan
ˆ vs =0and




u(r)dF (r|v) − cb (v).
In a DB plan, ˆ vb =0and




rdF (r|v) − cs (v).
This stands in marked contrast to the complete contracting situation.
There is no guarantee that the party with the comparative advantage in
being vigilant is responsible for doing so.
This ﬁnding breaks the indiﬀerence between DB and DC plans which we
found under complete contracting. In fact, the allocation of residual claims
now rests exclusively on comparative advantage in exercising vigilance. We
will work with an example which parametrizes the marginal cost of moni-
toring in a simple way. Speciﬁcally, let cb (vb)=1
2κbv2
i. The sponsor has
vigilance cost cs (vs)=1
2κsv2
s, where, typically, c<1. Suppose again that
the sponsor is in charge of designing the pension plan and she must provide
the beneﬁciary with expected payoﬀ u.
It is easy to see that, for any u, the optimal plan gives residual claimancy
to the party with the lower vigilance cost:
ilance incentives will also make investments in assets with a higher moral hazard danger.
This potentially interesting problem is left for future research.
14Proposition 4 If κs < κb (κs > κb), then the sponsor will oﬀer a DB (DC)
plan.
This result endogenizes the choice between DB and DC. One might think
that the sponsor has more resources than beneﬁciaries. This would provide
a powerful argument in favor of DB plans. In the end of this section we will
contrast this result with the available empirical evidence.
5.1 Trustees
The previous analysis rested on the existence of a unitary beneﬁciary. How-
ever, beneﬁciaries are typically a large dispersed group while the sponsor may
be a more concentrated interest. The present section identiﬁes a free-riding
problem among beneﬁciaries and introduces trustees as way of solving the
free-riding problem.
Suppose that there are n identical beneﬁciaries, each of which has vigi-
lance cost ci (vi)=1
2κbv2
i. The sponsor has vigilance cost cs (vs)=1
2κsv2
s.
Suppose also that beneﬁciaries are risk neutral and that the expected return
given total vigilance v = vs +
Pn
i=1 vi is simply
E (r|v)=v.
It is easy to see that the eﬃcient level of vigilance is vs = 1
κs and vi = 1
κb for
every beneﬁciary i. The expected return is then
³
1




However, in a DB plan, the equilibrium vigilance is vs = 1
κs with no
vigilance on the part of beneﬁciaries. The expected return in this case 1
κs.
In a DC scheme is vs =0a n dvi = 1
nκb for each beneﬁciary (and 1
κb in total),
with expected return 1
κb.
In both types of schemes we have the familiar problem that the party
who has no residual claim exerts no vigilance. But in a DC scheme there is
an additional issue. The beneﬁciaries have a joint residual claim and each
of them does not internalize the full beneﬁt of additional vigilance. This
free-riding problem leads to a level of vigilance, 1
κb, which is lower than the
level that is collectively optimal — n
κb. This is due to the fact that vigilance
is public good and beneﬁciaries free ride on the vigilance exerted by others.
Suppose that
κb
n < κs < κb. Then, if the beneﬁciaries could agree on a
common vigilance level, a DC plan would be better than a DC plan, while
15if there is a free-riding problem, a DB beats DC. We summarize the above
with
Proposition 5 T h ep r e s e n c eo fm u l t i p l eb e n e ﬁciaries rather than a unitary
beneﬁciary creates a free-riding problem in beneﬁciary vigilance. This reduces
the attractiveness of DC plans vis-` a-vis DB plans.
The appointment of a trustee can be thought of as a means of overcoming
this free-rider problem. The next subsection will delve deeper into the issue
of what motivates trustees. For now, let us assume that the trustee acts
perfectly in the beneﬁciaries’ interest when exercising vigilance in a DC plan
and has a cost of monitoring is: ct (vt)=1
2κtv2
t. Then in a DC plan, the
equilibrium level of vigilance is vt = 1
κt. We thus draw the following lessons:
Proposition 6 Trustees provide a possible solution to free riding among ben-
eﬁciaries. A DC (DB) plan is optimal if the beneﬁciaries’ trustee has a lower
(higher) cost of vigilance than the sponsor.
The lesson of this section is that the presence of a third-party monitor
is particularly useful when the party with residual claim rights faces a free
riding problem. As this is more likely to happen for beneﬁciaries, a strong
and motivated board of trustees should be viewed as an essential ingredient,
especially of DC plans.9
5.2 Evidence on Performance
The main message of the model with non-contractible vigilance is that the
performance of a fund depends on the capacity of the residual claimant to
exert eﬀort. The normative lesson is that we should give residual claim to
the party with better monitoring skills. It is instructive to benchmark some
of these theoretical ﬁndings against available empirical evidence.
In practice most people would argue that the sponsor has a double ad-
vantage over beneﬁciaries. First, being a unitary player she does not face a
free-riding problem. Second, she might draw on in-house expertise to ensure
proper monitoring. If this is true, DB plans should display a better perfor-
mance than DC plans, and this would provide a strong argument in favor of
9Free rider problems could also aﬄict DB plans with multiple sponsors — for example
a scheme that is industry wide with sponsors being speciﬁc ﬁrms in the industry. Similar
logic would then apply to the role of trustees in DB plans.
16DB. To evaluate this statement, note that performance has two components:
returns and costs.
With regards to cost, there is a large body of literature comparing ad-
ministrative charges (any cost incurred in running the pension plan, from
distribution costs to management fees) across countries and types of funds.
These charges turn out be quite high: Murthi, Orszag, and Orszag [9] es-
timate that in the UK administrative costs take away 25% of the pension
value (accumulation ratio) of a typical individual account pension. White-
house [22] reports extensive international evidence that individual plans (in
w h i c he a c hb e n e ﬁciary is responsible for choosing and monitoring his asset
manager) have higher fees than institutional plans. For instance, charges for
Australia’s individual accounts are more than twice as high those of Aus-
tralia’s institutional accounts. Whitehouse ascribes the charge diﬀerence to
the complexity of understanding the fee structure of pension funds. Clearly,
overcoming this complexity is feasible for an professional investor but harder
for an individual investor. These facts are consistent with the idea that de-
centralized beneﬁciary monitoring leads to lower levels of vigilance and hence
worse performance.
With regards to returns, the theory predicts that professional investors
obtain larger returns than retail investors because, having a lower cost of
monitoring, they exercise more vigilance in equilibrium. This, however, is
in contrast with the ﬁndings of Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny [6]. The
analyze a large database of US all-equity pension funds from 1983 to 1989.
They ﬁnd that (the equity-invested component of) the average pension funds
underperforms the S&P 500 index. This is true for pre-fee returns and holds
a fortiori once fees are taken into account. Virtually no money manager in
the sample produces a long-term post-fee return above the S&P 500. Even
more interestingly, pension funds appear to mutual funds. This is in clear
contradiction with our prediction that professional investors (who are the
purchasers of pension funds) should do better than retail investor (who buy
mutual funds).10
Theory predicts that asset managers that are monitored by large profes-
sional investors (pension funds) should perform better than asset managers
that are monitored by individual and relatively inexpert investors (mutual
funds). It is therefore surprising to ﬁnd that such performance diﬀerential
is not observed in practice — an possibly the opposite is. One possibility
10Del Guercio and Tkac [2] also study pension fund returns.
17is that, because all the funds in the sample are DC schemes, there is actu-
ally a lack of vigilance from trustees, who are mostly related to the sponsor.
An agency-theoretic explanation is advanced by Lakonishok et al. [6], who
suggest that the additional monitoring activity of pension trustees may ac-
tually be the cause of the lower returns. While retail investors pick funds
almost exclusively on the basis of past performance, pension trustees also
use other information, such as the stated fund strategy. The reliance on
non-performance information may encourage fund managers to focus their
energy on “looking good” with the pension trustees, for instance by present-
ing a consistent story, to the possible detriment of performance.
Prat [17] provides a formalization of the argument put forward by Lakon-
ishok et al. [6]. There is a pool of investors and a fund manager may be
good or bad. A good fund manager is better at predicting changes in asset
prices. The fund manager is driven by career concerns: he wants to persuade
investors that he is good because he will attract more funds in the future.
Investors are rational and evaluate the fund manager’s ability based on all
available information. The investors always observe the return generated by
the fund manager. The question is whether it is in their interest to observe
also the composition of the portfolio chosen by the manager. It turns out
that it may be optimal for investors to commit not to observe the compo-
sition. If the fund manager knows that he is evaluated only on observed
return, he has an incentive to maximize expected return. If he knows that he
is also evaluated on the portfolio he chooses, he has an incentive to choose the
portfolio that maximizes his chance to be perceived as good. This creates an
incentive to behave in a conformist way, to the detriment of expected return.
In practice, portfolio composition is not observable in mutual funds (in which
individually-managed accounts are typically invested) but it is observed in
pension funds. This diﬀerence may explain the apparent lackluster returns
of DB pension funds.
5.3 Professional Experts or Caring Laymen?
There is a great deal of variation in the background and motivation of
trustees. A recent survey by Robinson and Kakabadse [18] reports that only
7% of UK trustees have speciﬁc investment qualiﬁcations and only 22.5%
have professional accounting qualiﬁcations. Over 50% have no speciﬁcq u a l -
iﬁcation. Is there an optimal trustee proﬁle? Does it depend on the type of
environment and/or the type of scheme?
18In the previous section, the issue was whether or not a trustee was an
expert in the sense of being skilled at exercising vigilance. But this said
nothing about what kind of trustee would provide the best incentives to
monitor. Here, we contrast two stylized models: inside trustees and outside
trustees. The outsiders are experts, who have the potential of exercising very
eﬀective vigilance. However, the outsiders have no direct stake in the pension
scheme, so they must be driven by external incentives (career concerns).
According to this view, an outside trustees who is perceived to be capable
will get future rewards in the form of more lucrative or prestigious jobs
in the future.11 In contrast, we model insiders as having less investment
expertise, but a greater intrinsic commitment to the beneﬁciaries. This
could be because they are beneﬁciaries themselves or because they feel a
bond with the other beneﬁciaries who are co-workers, friends etc.. While,
our distinction between insiders and outsiders is a rough and ready, it seems
like a sensible starting point to think about trustees. In particular, the
competent but career oriented trustee may be a useful way of capturing the
professional cadre of pension fund trustee that was suggested by the Myners
report [10]. However, it is clear that, in reality, some insiders have great
technical competence while some outsiders can feel a strong sense of duty to
the fund beneﬁciaries. Still, we feel that this distinction reﬂects an important
trade-oﬀ that may arise in the selection of trustees.
Consider ﬁrst the insider. His vigilance cost is c(v)=1
2κv2, and he












For modelling outside trustees we follow (a simpliﬁed version of) Holm-
strom’s [4] career concerns model. The outsider trustee has the same vigi-
lance cost of the insider: c(v)=1
2κv2, but the eﬀect of vigilance on returns
depends on his type θ, which is distributed as a normal with mean m and
11We need not assume that outsiders are necessarily motivated by money; they may
strive for prestige or status. The crucial point is that their goals can only be achieved
through external recognition rather than intrinsic satisfaction.
19precision hθ (the precision is 1/variance).12 An outsider of type θ who exerts
vigilance v obtains a return
r = θ + v + ²,
where ² is distributed as a normal with mean 0 and precision h².T h eo u t s i d e r
does not know his own type. His future reward depends on the posterior on
his type that is assessed (by a market for potential employees) based on the
observed return. Let ˆ θ(r)b et h ep o s t e r i o re v a l u a t e db yt h em a r k e tu s i n g






where β is a positive constant that captures the strength of career concerns.
Following Holmstrom [4], it is possible to obtain:






Proof. Suppose the market for potential employees expects the trustee
to choose vigilance v∗. Then, by Bayes’ theorem, the market uses posterior
ˆ θ(r)=














which can be rewritten as
max
v β
















β (hθ + hε)
.
The key observation for our purpose is that eﬀort is decreasing in the
variance of the noise component ε. The higher σ²,t h em o r ed i ﬃcult it is,
given the observed performance, to separate luck from ability or eﬀort. A
good return is more likely to be due to the ε component than to θ + v.
Therefore, a good return has less eﬀect on the trustee’s posterior. This in
turn reduces the trustee’s incentive to exert eﬀort.
To ﬁx ideas, it is useful to examine the two extreme cases where h² →∞
and h² = 0. In the former, the equilibrium vigilance level is a
c.A s s u m i n g
that the career concern strength is above a certain threshold (β > 1), then
an outsider trustee supplies a better expected performance than an insider.
If instead, h² = 0, it is immediate to see that the outsider puts no eﬀort, and
an insider produces a better expected return. To summarize:
Proposition 8 An outside trustee performs better than an insider when the
market provides strong career concerns (β is high) and the link between vigi-
lance and return is direct (h² is high). An inside trustees perform better when
career concerns are weak and the vigilance-return link is noisy.
The proposition reﬂects some of the determinants of the trade-oﬀ between
using professional experts or relying on internal laymen. In principle, outside
experts can provide excellent vigilance, but they must be motivated to do
so by the prospect of external rewards, which requires two conditions. First,
there must be an established mechanism through which trustees that are
perceived to be capable are rewarded. This may happen through other job
oﬀers or perhaps the enjoyment of wide reputation. Second, there should be a
clear link between vigilance and return. It is not enough that this link exists
in expected value (which is what counts from a welfare point of view). In
order to provide the trustee with career concerns incentives, the link should
also be relatively noise-free. It would be important to know whether these
two conditions are met in practice.
The above discussion makes no intrinsic distinction between trusteeship
in DB and DC schemes. This would depend on whether insider motivation
is higher in one case of another. To this end, one possibility is that inside
21trustees have stronger intrinsic motivation when they know that their fellow
workers are the residual claimants. Then the conclusion would be as follows:
Proposition 9 DC plans should rely more on self-motivated insiders while
DB plans should be overseen by professional experts.
The analysis has focused so far on incentives of pension fund trustees.
However, it also suggests reasons why selection can be important. Indeed,
trustee selection may be important dimension of pension fund governance.
One issue is whether the beneﬁciaries should be given some direct input in
this or whether the task of trustee selection is delegated to the sponsor.
In DC plans, the sponsor would have little incentive to scrutinize potential
trustees in order to optimally resolve the trade-oﬀ in this section. Thus, we
w o u l de x p e c tt h a tt h eb e n e ﬁciaries (suitably informed) to be given the right
to select trustees in DC plans. We would similarly expect beneﬁciary input
in trustee selection to be less important in DB plans.13
6 Asset Allocation
We now switch to concerns in pension governance that relate to asset allo-
cation. As discussed in the introduction, by “asset allocation” we mean a
high-level decision on broad classes on investment instruments, which is not
the responsibility of fund managers. A typical fund manager operates within
a well-deﬁned investment class, such as domestic stocks or ﬁxed income.
This section deals with a potential moral hazard problem that arises
when the sponsor has some control on asset allocation. The degree of control
varies a lot according to the type of plan. In some old-fashioned DB plans, the
sponsor makes asset allocation decisions directly. However, in most collective
plans asset allocation is the responsibility of trustees. The question then
arises of how much control the sponsor has over the trustees. While trustees
are nominally acting on behalf of beneﬁciaries, it is commonly believed that
the sponsor has considerable inﬂuence on the nomination process and, more
in general, on the decision-making of trustees.
A very interesting issue is how much control over asset allocation sponsors
have in individually-managed retirement plans. This issue is particularly de-
bated in the US with regards to 401(k) plans (Mitchell and Utkus [8, p. 4] and
13An exception (discussed further below) would be in distressed pension, i.e., those
which are close to insolvency.
22Poterba [15]). The asset allocation decision rests with the beneﬁciary, who
selects among several investment options. However, the investment menu is
assembled by the employer and it may include the employer’s stock. The
employer has thus several way to inﬂuence asset allocation, from restricting
investment options to oﬀering additional beneﬁts for own stock purchases.
Moreover, Mitchell and Utkus [8, p. 4] suggest behavioral explanations.
There is evidence that framing eﬀects and other forms of psychological pres-
sure have powerful eﬀects on individual ﬁnancial decisions.
In the following, we assume that the sponsor has some control — whether
direct or indirect — on asset allocation. We mostly think about investment
in own stock, which is a widespread phenomenon in the US. The much pub-
licized ENRON case is far from unique. Mitchell and Utkus [8, p. 4] report
t h a to v e r5m i l l i o nA m e r i c a nw o r k e r sh a v eaD Cp l a ni nw h i c hm o r et h a n
60% of the funds are held in their employer’s stock.
The sponsor selects an asset allocation a from a set of feasible allocations
A. The range of the feasible set is determined by the ability of the sponsor
to control allocation. Each allocation a creates a direct beneﬁto rc o s td(a).
While the model is general, we mostly think of the beneﬁta sa r i s i n gf r o m
investment in own stock.
In a DB plan, the sponsor chooses portfolio allocation





w h i l ei naD Cp l a ns h ec h o o s e s
ˆ aDC ∈ argmax
a d(a).
Clearly, ˆ aDB is eﬃcient while ˆ aDC is typically not. Given a DC plan the








which is identical to the level of monitoring achieved in a DB plan.
Thus we have:
Proposition 10 Sponsor determined asset allocation is eﬃcient in a DB
plan but not in a DC plan. Thus, if the sponsor controls asset allocation, a
DB plan is preferable.
23The fact that the sponsor is not a residual claimant under a DC plan
m e a n st h a th ew i l ln o tw e i g h tt h ee ﬀect of his asset allocation decision on
the expected returns of beneﬁciaries. He is driven purely by any private
motives that he has. This clearly has implications for the transition from
DB to DC plans where the sponsor retains a signiﬁcant role in asset allocation
decisions.14
The result is consistent with the evidence in Meulbroek’s [7] study. They
argue that DC plans in the US are highly undiversiﬁed and they provide a
quantiﬁcation of the undiversiﬁcation cost: under reasonable assumptions, a
DC plan beneﬁciary who has half of his wealth in a pension plan which invests
half of his assets in company stock values company stock 42% less than its
market value. Meulbroek’s cost estimate is a lower bound because it does
not consider the possibility of a positive covariance between the employee’s
salary and the company stock price.
These issues are even more pressing in a situation where the a plan may
become insolvent and the sponsor is protected by limited liability. Suppose
that the sponsor’s net worth (disregarding the pension scheme) is N.A l s o ,
assume that pension beneﬁts are the most senior claim. Then, the promised
pension p is paid in full only if it is lower than the combined value of the
pension fund and the sponsor’s net worth:
p ≤ N + r.













(r − p + N)dF (r|a)+w
For N ≥ p, we recover the unlimited liability case analyzed so far.
Now, it becomes clear that even in a DB plan the sponsor does not nec-
essarily choose the eﬃcient a. Given that she holds the equivalent of a call
14The optimality of a DB plan with sponsor controlled asset allocation holds up even the
possibility of beneﬁciary controled allocation is considered. A beneﬁciary has no direct
interest in asset allocation in a DB plan and would choose asset allocation to maximize
the expected return in a DB plan under our current assumptions. In neither case is the
asset allocation eﬃcient except when d(a) = 0, in which case DB and DC plans with asset
allocation controled by their residual claimants are equally good.
24option on the fund return, she has an incentive to increase the variance of
the return, which can be achieved by lack of diversiﬁcation.15
Proposition 11 If insolvency is possible and the sponsor controls asset al-
location, then even under DB the resulting allocation is ineﬃcient, in the
sense that it is too risky. This problem is worse, the smaller is N relative to
p.
Intuitively, this is driven by the fact that the sponsor cares only about the
states in which the pension plan is solvent. The tendency towards excessive
risk taking embodies the usual problem of “gambling for resurrection” which
occurs when there is limited liability.16
It should be noted that, since ERISA was passed in 1974, in the US the
risk of insolvency for DB plans is not borne by beneﬁciaries but by a federal
agency: the Pension Beneﬁt Guarantee Corporation. One of the provisions of
ERISA is that no DB plan can invest more than 10% of its funds in company
stock. As Mitchell and Utkus [8, p. 4] note, “Congress instituted the 10%
limit to avoid the moral hazard problem of plan sponsors investing pension
plans heavily in their own stock and leaving pension liabilities to the federal
government in the case of bankruptcy.” It is interesting that no limit is
imposed on DC plans despite the fact that they face the same moral hazard
problem.
7 Choice of a Funding Level
The analysis so far has abtracted from underfunding issues by holding ﬁxed
the contribution level of the sponsor. In DC plans, this is a reasonable
assumption because employer contributions are typically a component of
employment contracts. However, in DB plans, this is not necessarily the
case. Most often, there is some kind of a requirement that the fund assets
are suﬃcient to cover future liabilities. However, the terms “suﬃcient” and
“future liabilities” are open to interpretation as recent events have brought
15See Blake [1] for a general way of representing pension schemes as options on pension
fund assets.
16Beneﬁciary controled asset allocation may now be optimal. Indeed, if d(a) = 0, a DC
plan with asset allocation under the control of the beneﬁciary is optimal. In general there
is a trade-oﬀ between DC/DB and sponsor versus beneﬁciary controled asset allocation
depending on d(a)a n dt h es i z eo fN.
25into sharp relief. Given that asset returns are not entirely predictable, the
“suﬃcient” part is subject to market risk. The “future liabilities” are also
uncertain because they depend on wages and job separations. It is the job of
trustees, assisted by actuaries, to express an opinion on whether the funding
requirement is satisﬁed. Clearly, this opinion is subjective. Several methods
are consistent with accepted actuarial practices. In as much as the sponsor
nominates and supervises trustees, we should expect the trustees’ opinions
to be inﬂuenced by the sponsor’s preferences.
Underfunding of DB plans has recently come to the fore in the UK fol-
lowing the adoption of a new accounting standard, FRS 17, which requires
pension fund assets to be measured using market value. This new require-
ment, combined with a fall in stock prices, has generated fears that many
of the leading UK DB pension plans will display severe underfunding. As a
result, either the plans will be closed or the sponsors will have to make ad-
ditional contributions. A recent Financial Times article [20] estimates that
in a sample of large DB plans the current funding level is 87%.17
We formalize the issue as follows. Suppose that a DB plan has a funding
level θ ≤ 1. The upper bound is assumed to be set by the tax system. To
simplify matters, we hold ﬁxed the vigilance level and the investment policy,
so that the return distribution is simply F(r). The level of beneﬁts speciﬁed
in the contract are funded if rθ ≥ p. Hence, there is a critical level of the
return: p/θ such that the commitment can be honored if and only if the
return exceeds this level. Now consider the choice of funding level by the
sponsor in a DB plan.
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It is straightforward, to see that the eﬃcient level of funding (that maximizes
the joint payoﬀ of the sponsor and beneﬁciary) which would be chosen under
complete contracts is θ = 1 as long as pension investments are worthwhile
at all, i.e.
R ∞
0 rdF (r) > 1. Now consider what happens when the funding
level is not contractible. In this case, the sponsor will choose:
17In the case of overfunding, the sponsor does not necessarily have access to the excess
portion of the fund. Petersen [14] studies the phenomenon of pension plan reversions in
the United States, that is, the termination of overfunded pension plans.
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It is straightforward to check that the payoﬀ function is convex in θ.H e n c e ,
it will either be optimal for the sponsor to put in no resources (θ =0 )o rt h e
full amount (θ =1 ) . As u ﬃcient condition for full funding is
R ∞
p rdF (r) >
1. This says essentially that stock market returns above the level of the
beneﬁt commitment needs to be attractive to the sponsor. This is a stricter
condition for full funding than required in the eﬃcient solution.
Proposition 12 In DB plans with the possibility of insolvency, sponsors
may have an incentive to shirk on their contributions. In this case, a DC
plan is optimal.
This result can help us to understand the current move towards DC plans
in a world where underfunding is a serious issue. The fact that stock market
returns have fallen can imply that funding DB commitments is no longer
optimal (θ
s
DB =0 ) .
The analysis makes clear why controlling θ by imposing some minimum
funding θ is important in the context of sponsor incentives. This raises the
more general issue of the extent to which funding can be contracted upon
and monitored. The recent debate in the UK about FRS 17 illustrates the
issues vividly. FRS 17 requires pension fund assets to be measured using
market value. While FRS 17 does not modify the funding requirement θ
per se, it forces greater transparency. With the new rules, several pension
schemes appear to be severely underfunded. In this sense, the introduction
of FRS 17 is not dissimilar from a statutory increase in θ. The shift that
we are seeing towards DC should be seen as a response to the diﬃculties to
ﬁnding ways of undoing incentives of sponsors to underfund their pension
plans when market returns to investing are low.
Another solution suggested by the model is to have more direct input by
beneﬁciaries into determining contribution levels as a means of encouraging
eﬃcient funding levels. One possibility is to give power to trustees to coerce
sponsors. However, this clearly leads to issues of corporate governance which
go beyond the scope of this paper.
278 Conclusions
This paper is a ﬁrst step toward an analysis of pension fund governance
from a contract-theoretic perspective. While we hope that future research
will explore this approach further, and perhaps complement it with other
methodologies, it is useful at this point to summarize the main results:
1. If the sponsor and the beneﬁciary have complete contracting ability, the
allocation of residual claim rights becomes irrelevant from a governance
point of view. The party who is less risk-averse — typically the sponsor
— should be the residual claimant. This argument goes in favor of DB
plans.
2. With incomplete contracts, residual claimancy matters for governance.
If we focus on vigilance, we should make the party with a lower vigilance
cost the residual claimant.
3. If beneﬁciaries are disperses and disorganized, DC plans face a free-
riding problem that reduces vigilance. The presence of a strong and
motivated board of trustees may provide a solution.
4. The choice between professional outsiders or caring insiders depends
on whether career incentives to outsiders are expected to function ef-
fectively. This depends on the existence of a well-deﬁned job market
for trustees and of a relatively noiseless link between trustees’ behavior
and fund performance. We should expect DB plans to make more use
of outsiders and DC plans to rely more on insiders.
5. If the sponsor is responsible for asset allocation, the risk of mis-allocation
is an issue especially in DC plans because the sponsor’s allocation objec-
tives are not aligned with the goal of eﬃcient allocation. The problem
is present also in DB plans if there is a possibility of insolvency.
6. Underfunding is not an issue in DC plans, but it can be a problem in
DB plans if there is a possibility of insolvency.
Throughout the paper, we have tried to compare the predictions that
come from our theory with available empirical evidence. Point 3 is consistent
with the observation that administrative costs are generally higher in DC
plans. However, the complementary prediction that returns too should be
28higher in DB plans does not appear to receive empirical support. Regarding
point 5, the case of US 401k plans appear to be consistent with the prediction
that there could be lack of asset diversiﬁcation in sponsor-controlled DC
plans. Point 6 suggests that underfunding could be an issue in DB plans
unless strict regulation is in place — a prediction that could be consistent
with recent developments in UK DB plans.
The paper suggests some possible areas for future research. First, besides
Robinson and Kakabadse’s [18] survey, we do not have much information on
trustees. Point 4 suggests that trustee proﬁles in DB and DC plans should
display systematic diﬀerences. More generally, we expect the trustees’ ability
and willingness to monitor the fund to depend on their backgrounds and
their environment. In turn, monitoring should reﬂe c to np l a np e r f o r m a n c e .
It would then be useful to collect evidence on the link between institutional
features of trustee boards and performance of the plans that they oversee.
Second, it would useful to have more evidence on the performance of pen-
sion funds in comparison to the performance of mutual funds, along the lines
of Lakonishok et al. [6]. Their alleged ability to generate better performance
through more professional monitoring is a strong selling point of DB plans.
It would be important to verify or disprove this claim.
Third, in practice the distinction between DB and DC is not entirely clear.
Often in DB plans, the sponsor has some leeway in re-deﬁning the “deﬁned”
beneﬁts over time. Future theoretical research in this ﬁeld could study more
general claim structures and how governance plays a role in determining
these.
Fourth, it would be important to evaluate the extent of sponsor moral
hazard in the recent DB underfunding crisis. More knowledge in this area is
essential to to assess proposed regulatory changes. In particular, moral haz-
ard considerations should lead to some re-thinking of pension claim seniority
in the UK.
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